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A government of Laws, not of Men.
-John Adams'

I. Introduction

The implementation of the Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 as well
as the subsequent addition of Security Exchange Commission Rules w(b)s and
w(b)5-1 concretized a legal prohibition on "insider trading". Insider trading refers
generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a legal duty or other
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, non public
information about the security2 •
Simply, this means that if someone comes to possess information that
would persuade a reasonable person to trade on a security and that information is
not publicly available, they cannot trade on the information if they acquired it by
virtue of their position. The salient harm these proscriptions seek to redress is the
"fraud on the market" theory, or, the corruption of the integrity of a given market
by deceptive practices. Withholding material information therefore, would
influence a shareholder to act a certain way and therefore cause pecuniary injury.
Aside from the economic consequences of such conduct, the moral
reprehensibility of such a practice is self-evident: it is contrary to the objectively
fair purposes of the market. Each participant should be subject to the same risk as
every other participant.
1
2

Adams, John. Thoughts on Government. 1776.
Insider Trading U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, accessed February 21, 2012
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Although this ban on insider trading was considered illegal, there was no
direct, codified ban on the practice until2ooo. In 2ooo, SEC Rule w(b)s-r was
enacted which definitively prohibited the practice of insider trading. It reads:
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section 1o(b) of the Act and Rule wb-s
thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis
of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information?

Strangely, however, the ban on insider trading has not been applied to members of
Congress or their staffs. There is no rule explicitly prohibiting or allowing the
practice, rather, the notion comes from the requirement that traders must be "in
breach of a duty" in order to be subject to its provisions. While Congress is no
doubt in possession of inside information as part of their position, to date no court
or law expressly provides whether Congress therefore owes this duty. As a result,
Congressmen have exploited this void and engaged in the practice without
accountability.
This presents its own set of problems remarkably similar to those sought to
be prevented by Rules w(b)s and w(b)s-r. !fa Congressman, by virtue of his
position on a finance committee comes into contact with legislation he knows will
affect a certain market, his trading upon that market before the information is
publicly disclosed, provides him with a benefit denied to other stockholders. In
3

Securities Exchange Commission Rule lObS-1
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practice, this is not different than the company's CEO acting in-kind. Instead, the
"duty" that is currently ambiguous with respect to congressmen exists as part and
parcel of their duty as elected officials to act in the best interests of their country.
The forthwith discussion will explore both the legal and moral deficiencies of the
practice as well as the failure of subsequent attempts at remedy to adequately
resolve the issue.
II. Origins
a. Security Exchange Acts
During the Great Depression, the Security Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934
were enacted to provide greater regulation and oversight over the financial
markets of the United States 45 • The primary purpose of this legislation was to
compel corporations selling securities to register those securities and to disclose all
material information necessary to make an informed decision on whether to
purchase or sell said securities. The idea was to restore and maintain confidence
and trust in the markets and to hold accountable those corporations that
neglected their duties to their shareholders. In 1942, under the authority granted
to them by the 1934 Security Exchange Act, the SEC implemented Rule wb-5,
which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,

4
5

Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77a
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78c
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any securitl.
A facial reading of the law seems only to yield a mention of "fraud"7 but as it and
the markets evolved, it became better known for its role in prohibiting insider
trading. Specifically, the language proscribing trading based on non-public
information established the rule against the practice that is familiar today. The
language has since been modified by the landmark decision in Chiarella v. United
States8 which narrowed the rule to forbid trading on non-public information only
by those who owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the company or the
company itself. That case held that an employee for a printing company hired by
the corporation seeking takeover bids did not owe a duty to the shareholders of
that corporation even though the information he received was non-public 9 .

i. Classical Insider Trading
There are two categories of insider trading violations, each with its own
roster of eligible offenders. The first of these classes involve what are referred to as

6
7

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
1bid.

8

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
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"classical" insiders10 • "Classical" insiders are those whose duty to the corporation
and its shareholders stems from their position within the corporation itself. In
most cases, "classical" traders are directors, officers and controlling shareholders of
a corporation that use their positions to acquire and subsequently trade on nonpublic informationu. Rule wb-5 and its subsequent interpretations have imposed a
duty upon these insiders to "disclose or abstain! 2 " Simply, those insiders with
access to material, non-public information must publicize that information or
elect not to trade upon it.
Following Chiarella, the Court wasted no time in adapting wb-5 to the
fluidity of the market. In Dirks v. SEC3, the Court expanded the application of the
"disclose or abstain" rule to encompass those who by virtue of even temporary
positions became privy to non-public information. In Dirks, Dirks was an officer
that provided investment analysis for a broker-dealer firm. He was approached by
an insider from a mutual fund and life insurance conglomerate and notified that
the corporation was overstating its assets'4 . Dirks was asked to investigate the
alleged fraud and in so doing, interviewed several employees each of whom
corroborated the insider's original allegations. Dirks subsequently offered his
findings to the Wall Street Journal, who, fearing retribution for libel, declined to
publish the information. Throughout, Dirks was informing his own clients to

10

Klein, William, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen Bainbridge. Business Associations. Chicago: Foundation
Press, 2009.
11
1bid.
12
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
13
Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 525 U.S. 1070
14
1d.
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reconsider their investments in the corporation. As a result, the corporation's
share value began fluctuating erratically prompting investigation from the SEC.
Ultimately, Dirks was found to have violated Rule wb-5 by disclosing material,
non-public information that he had acquired from his conversation from the
corporation's insider' 5.
The case ascended to the Supreme Court, where Dirks was acquitted, but
the boundaries for what was coined "constructive" and "tipper/tippee" liability
were demarcated. According to Dirks, "constructive" insiders were those who,
although not direct employees of a company, became privileged to non-public
information through special access'6 . This could apply to employees of the
accounting firm hired to manage the books of a corporation or of a law firm
retained to handle a merger. Dirks held that these sorts of individuals are
"insiders" based on their present duty to a corporation and the trust and
confidence imbued in them by the corporation: "The classical theory applies not
only to officers, directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also
to attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become
fiduciaries of a corporation. '7" Dirks stated that the company must actually expect
confidentiality from the individual and a special relationship must in fact exist'8.

"ld.
1d.
17
1d.
18
1d.
16
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Tipper-tippee liability is that which occurs from the leaking of non-public
information from an insider to an outsider' 9 . Dirks held that this relationship is
reciprocal and symbiotic. To establish tipper-tippee liability, the tipper must
breach his duty in disclosing the information and the tippee must have knowledge
or constructive knowledge of both the duty and the breach. Additionally, the
tippee must then transmit that information to traders or trade upon it himself and
the tipper must receive some pecuniary benefit in the release of said information20 •

ii. Misappropriation Theory
The second propagated theory of insider trading is referred to as
"misappropriation" theory. Misappropriation theory, concretized in United States
v. O'Hagan and codified in Rule w(b)(s)-z, extends liability to those who owe
"fiduciary-like" duties to the source of the non-public information they possess.
The Court held that criminal liability under§ w(b) of Securities Exchange Act may
be predicated on this theory, which permits imposition of liability on person who
trades in securities for personal profit using material, confidential information
without disclosing such use to source of information, in breach of fiducia1y duty to
that source. O'Hagan involved an attorney whose firm was hired to assist with the
tender offer and merger of a particular company. Although O'Hagan was not
assigned to the team selected to handle the merger, he used his access to the firmwide database to acquire information regarding the transaction. He subsequently
19

Klein, William, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Stephen Bainbridge.Business Associations. Chicago: Foundation
Press, 2009.
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traded upon that information without disclosing his intent to the source and was
convicted of insider trading21 • Succinctly, O'Hagan:
Could be found guilty of securities fraud in violation of Rule wb-5 under
misappropriation theory; defendant had duty to his law firm, and to tender
offeror as firm's client, to disclose use of information in connection with his
personal purchase and sale of target corporation's stock, and failure to make
such disclosure was "deceptive device" used in connection with purchase of
securities within meaning of§ w(b) of Securities Exchange Act. Securities
Exchange Act of193422 (emphasis added)
Indeed, the precipitous issue regarding misappropriation theory is the "deceit" or
"deceptive device" employed by which to take advantage of the information. The
Court referred to this as "feigning fidelity" to the source of the information while
dissembling the true purpose of profiting from the corporation's trust: "[T]he
deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the
source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade
on the nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no§ w(b)
violation [exists]. 23 " Again, the principles of honesty and trustworthiness pervade
the purposes of securities regulation.
Characteristic of our laws, insider trading regulations have been trimmed
and tailored to form nearly bright-line rules. The current state of the law then is
characterized by a handful of salient principles: the existence of a direct or indirect
duty between trader and corporation, the breach of that duty by trading upon or
revealing of that information and the substance of that information being that
which would induce a reasonable investor to trade.
21

United States v. O'Hagan 521 U.S. 642

"I d.
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One glaring void in these laws however, is the quaint exemption for
members of Congress. Congressman and Senators are permitted to engage in
insider trading without any legal repercussions. The exemption is subtle and no
casual reading of the rule or the surrounding case law would lend themselves to
reveal the exception. Simply, the loophole exists because the law does not attach a
duty of confidentiality- per the rule- to congressmen, towards Congress24 • A
common demonstration of the loophole is as follows: Congressman B learns that
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee has granted a multi-million dollar
defense contract to Company X in a Defense Appropriations bill. This is nonpublic information and it will most assuredly drive Company X's stock up.
Congressman B is free to trade on this information. This is not illegal by the
current law25 . The iniquity and injustice of this legal abyss as well as the corruption
it has proliferated is undeniable. The proposed legislation - and its limitations offered to correct this abomination will be discussed shortly.

c. Necessarily an Evil?
Although it may appear a global truth that insider trading is an unnecessary
evil properly proscribed by law, there are those that would dispute the vilification
of the practice. Chief among these critics is Milton Friedman, celebrated Nobel
laureate and professor of economics. Friedman, along with his peers, believed that

24

"Public Citizen on the STOCK Act." Public Citizen. http://action.citizen.org/campaign (accessed March 1,
2012).
25
Slaughter, Louise. "STOCK Act." Rep. Louise M. Slaughter. http://www.louise.house.gov/index.php
(accessed March 1, 2012).
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insider trading laws should be repealed because it actually benefits investors by
forcing more information into the market, sooner26 . Friedman also was known to
have stated: "You want more insider trading, not less. You want to give the people
most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive to
make the public aware ofthat. 27" Because the act of buying and selling was
information itself, Friedman did not feel it was necessary to disclose a trade upon
inside information.
Other adherents to this idea have argued that insider trading is a victimless
crime and thus should not be scrutinized to the degree that it is. Notably, when
the longest prison sentence for insider trading was passed upon Raj Rajartnam last
year, his lawyers argued "Insider trading does not cause the kinds of measurable
losses to identifiable victims that conventional fraud causes [do]. 28" Following
suit, John Carney, a Senior Economics Analyst for CNBC, proffers that because no
victims can be identified there are no victims and because there are no victims,
there is no crime 29 • More severely, advocates of the legalization philosophy believe
that insider trading laws amount to unconstitutional censorship and are violative
of first amendment free speech protections 30 • This argument rests on the

" Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2003. Chapter 29 "Insider Trading" p. 591-597
27

1d.

28

Lattman, Peter. 11 ln Galleon Case, Prison Term is Seen as Test. n New York Times.
http:!/dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/in-galleon-insider-case-prison-term-is-seen-as-test//index.php
(accessed March 1, 2012)
29
Carney, John. "Raj's Sentence Is Too Long." CNBC. http://www.cnbc.com/id/44894853 (accessed March
3, 2012).
30
McGee, Robert and Walter Block. "Information, Privilege, Opportunity and Insider Trading." Northern
Illinois University Law Review 10 (1989): 2-35.
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perception that a law punishing an individual for communicating information regardless of its content- is tantamount to government sanctioned silencing3'.
Attempts at justification in this manner serve only to demonstrate the
pedantic, detached and often argumentative nature of the academic community"pretenders to profound knowledge, ignorant of the most useful of all sciences: the
science of human nature. 3"' In what appears to be a position that is at best
disingenuous and at worst dangerous, these "scholars" irresponsibly disregard the
human element that is inexorably woven into our society, our laws and our
behaviors. Indeed, it is the human element that academics tend to discard in
fabricating their theories. Theories that, when removed from the vacuum from
which they were created and implemented into the ever-vacillating and frequently
unpredictable reality of society, find little traction.
The concept that insider trading creates no victims and should therefore be
relieved of the legal prohibition it carries disregards several other laws that could
also be considered "victimless" and yet remain illegal. In fact, many other crimes
involving "possession", of firearms, narcotics and other such contraband have no
direct or identifiable victims but are ferociously- and successfully- prosecuted
when it is proven that such possession risks a subsequent unlawful purpose. The
law is feckless if it waits for victims to appear before taking action. While
possessing drugs, weapons or other dangerous substances is not inherently
dangerous, the law responsibly removes the threat proactively. Similarly, insider
31
32

1d.
McCullough, John Adams at 436
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trading is a per se deceitful behavior- it involves the intentional concealment of
beneficial or deleterious information from the public to benefit an individual or
group of individuals. Like the gun toting gang-member or the dope-slinging
degenerate, the dishonest businessman's penchant for unscrupulous behavior
portends the probability that other such frauds may occur. In reality, the insider
trading laws are more lenient than the aforesaid possession statutes -possession of
inside information is not illegal, only the transaction of it.
Friedman's assessment of insider trading relies on the assumption that
those in possession of potentially damaging information will be willing to
disseminate that information. In so doing, Friedman ignores "the science of human
nature" and a fundamental human flaw: greed. Triumph in business feeds on the
concept of individual gain; it has forged the mightiest global conglomerates and
produced some of the wealthiest people in the world. The legendary philosopher
Ayn Rand quite clearly recognized this necessity: "Man -every man- is an end in
itself, not the means to the ends of others. Must exist by itself and for itself,
without sacrifice for others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of selfinterest, rational self and his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his
lifeY" Following suit, an individual in possession of information that could benefit
him greatly if concealed or himself and others if revealed, will naturally gravitate
toward the former. Evidence of this preference is readily observable in capitalist
society.

33

Rand, Ayn. Virtue of Selfishness. 1964.
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Power differentials, wealth inequality and laissez-faire policy are the pillars
upon which the financial viability of a capitalist nation rests. To then claim that in
spite of these principles, a man will still choose equality over enrichment is
fallacious; one need look no further than our legislature to be certain. Reduced to
its most fundamental function, the Congress of the United States exists only to
serve and to protect the citizens of the United States. It would appear then, that if
Friedman's theory were correct, an institution created to benefit other people
would be the first to embrace the notion of promoting equality over self-interest,
yet, as discussed, this is not the case34 •

III. Exposure
What remains, following the increasing divergence from true, American,
republican values, is a condition where elected representatives serve to profit
themselves and not their constituents. Insider trading -that is breaking the lawby our own government, undermines public confidence in that government and
poses a grave threat to the public as a result. News broadcast "6o Minutes" brought
the issue of Congressional insider trading to sudden and tumultuous disclosure in
November 2011 and in so doing, revealed the reprehensible and self-serving
conduct of our representatives 35 . The program sought to dispense of the secrecy
surrounding this behavior by interviewing and questioning several prominent

34

Kroft, Steve. "Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information?." CBS News.
http://www .cbsn ews.com/8301-18560 _162 -57 323527 I congress-exempt -from-insider-trading-laws/
(accessed March 4, 2012).
35
ld.
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members of the House of Representatives including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi
and current Speaker John Boehner36 . Their attempts were largely in vain and when
finally cornered at their weekly press conference, both Speakers provided
defensive, evasive and aggressive responses to questions pertaining to their
conduct37 •
Speaker Boehner was asked generally if he felt it was appropriate that
members of congress be allowed to trade on non-public information to which he
answered that there "were many rules governing the ethics of house members and
that [he] believed members obeyed them38". Speaker Pelosi was questioned
directly on her trade of Initial Public Offering stock from VISA during a time when
new credit card regulations were pending in the House of Representatives. Asked if
she felt if there was a conflict with that purchase, she replied that she "didn't see a
point to what [6o Minutes Reporter Steve Kroft] was saying" and asked him "what
[his] point was. 39 " That our elected leadership does not recognize that their
behavior is unethical is far more dangerous than the conscious schemers that
simply disregard the fact. Mere weeks following this report, President Obama
declared in his State of the Union "present me with a bill banning insider trading

36
37
38
39

1d.
1d.
1d.
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for congressmen and I will sign it. 40 " The point having been made, it seems
congress was finally cornered.

a. The STOCK Act
The "Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge" Act, or STOCK Act, was
originally introduced in the House of Representatives on Mar. 28, 2006 by Brian
Baird (D-WA) and Louise Slaughter (D-NY) where it died in committee. It was
reintroduced the following year, as well as in 2009, where it also died in
committee 4 '. In December 2011, following the 6o Minutes piece, the Act was
revived only to be quashed by congressional bureaucracy: "House Majority Leader
Eric Cantor (R-VA) indefinitely postponed the ... session on Dec. 7, 2011, stating
that 'a large group of bipartisan members of the committee felt the legislation was
flawed and being recklessly moved solely in response to media pressure. Members
of both sides of the aisle wanted more time to gather information and develop
appropriate alternativesY"' Only after the President's speech in January 2012 did
Congress get around to passing a preliminary version of the bill, somehow
acquiring 96 votes in the Senate and an overwhelming 417 votes in the House43 .
While it appears that issue has finally been resolved, a closer look at the
STOCK Act reveals just how little corrective good it does and how little would
40

"Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address." White House.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address
(accessed March 7, 2012).
41
"What is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge {STOCK) Act?." ProCon.
http://insidertrading.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceiD=004520 (accessed March 7, 2012).

42
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"STOCK Act Votes." Politico. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72670.html (accessed March
7, 2012).
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actually be changed. Respected Professor and author Stephen Bainbridge
expounds on the limitations and recognizes the futility of this law as a mechanism
for reform 44 . The misleading clause within the Act states that it prevents:
[A]ny person from buying or selling the securities or security-based
swaps of any issuer while such person is in possession of material
nonpublic information relating to any pending or prospective
legislative action relating to such issuer, if-(A) such information was obtained by reason of such person
being a Member or employee of Congress; or
(B) such information was obtained from a Member or
employee of Congress, and such person knows that the information
was so obtained. 4 5
This means that any member or employee of Congress cannot trade on material,
non-public information if it is related to "pending or prospective legislative action"
and tippees are banned from trading on the information if they know the source is
a member or employee of Congress.
Professor Bainbridge notes the ambiguity of "pending or prospective
legislative action" as well as its narrow constraints 46 . Bainbridge describes
numerous hypothetical situations that would be simple to devise to effectively
circumvent the law:

•

After Congress defeats proposed legislation that would have sharply
increased Acme's costs of doing business, Acme's CEO gives a key
Congressman a hot tip on Acme stock as a pay off. There was a legislative
action, but it was in the past and, accordingly, is neither pending nor
prospective.

44

Bainbridge, Stephen. "I Have Seen the STOCK Act and I Am Unimpressed." Stephen Bainbridge.
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/11/i-have-seen-the-stock-act-and-iam-unimpressed.html (accessed March 10, 2012).
451d.
461d.
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•

•

•

A Member of Congress learned from a Cabinet member that a government
agency was about to enter a large procurement contract. There is no
"pending or prospective" legislative action, but there is valuable material
nonpublic information on which the member could trade.
The CEO of Acme is an avid hunter. Congress is considering legislative
action that would ban hunting of the CEO's favorite game animal. The CEO
of Acme gives a key Congressman a hot tip on Acme stock as a bribe to
oppose the hunting law. This is perhaps the most egregious form of
Congressional insider trading, yet there is no "pending or prospective
legislative action relating to such issuer." To the contrary, the legislative
action in question is entirely unrelated to the issuer.
During a confidential committee investigation, a Member of Congress
learns that Acme is about to announce a major new discovery. The member
infers that Ajax-Acme's major competitor-will take a serious hit. The
member shorts Ajax stock. Technically, the member has not traded in the
stock of"such issuer." 47

None of these situations present any difficulty or substantial obstacle to impede
members of Congress from carrying on "business as usual". Another deceptive
component of the Act is the reporting requirement.

Within 90 days after the purchase, sale, or exchange of any stocks,
bonds, commodities futures, or other forms of securities that are
otherwise required to be reported under this Act and the transaction
of which involves at least $1,ooo by any Member of Congress or
officer or employee of the legislative branch required to so file, that
Member, officer, or employee shall file a report of that transaction
with the Clerk of the House of Representatives in the case of a
Representative in Congress, a Delegate to Congress, or the Resident
Commissioner from Puerto Rico, or with the Secretary of the Senate
in the case of a Senator. 48
Essentially, Congressmen and Senators have 90 days to report their dealings if
those dealings were worth $1,ooo or more. However, Section 16 of the Securities

47
48

1d.
1d.
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and Exchange Act requires corporate insiders to report within only

2

days 49 .

Congressman Sean Duffy (R-Wisc) even condemns the "loop hole" stating: "For
example, under the STOCK Act, a Member of Congress could trade $5o,ooo in one
day in so trades at $950 a trade and never trigger the reporting requirement. 50 "
Subtly and again, Congress attempts to elevate themselves above the standards set
for average citizens, while their conduct lands them decidedly beneath them.
Summarily, the STOCK Act is an insultingly clumsy attempt at remediation for a
practice so markedly distasteful.
b. Exceptionalism
Despite the uncounted legal potholes the STOCK Act leaves untended, it is
still necessary to demonstrate why the passage of this law continues a tradition of
congressional exceptionalism. The simplest way to discuss this would be to
compare the STOCK Act to those laws preventing insider trading to the rest of the
population. That law, SEC Rule w(b)5-1 states:
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section w(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-s
thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis
of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information.5l

49

15 U.S. C. §78c, Section 16
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51
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This law unambiguously prohibits the practice of insider trading to anyone with a
duty to the shareholders of that corporation. w(b)5-1 does in one paragraph what
the STOCK Act cannot in several. Rather than merely appending the existing rule
to include a specific ban on congressmen and their staffs, the STOCK Act was,
through painful specificity, sure to avoid the issue entirely. However there have
been alternatives proposed and while they are not likely to ever be passed, they are
worth extrapolation.
c. A Stronger Alternative: the RESTRICT Act
Congressman Sean Duffy (R-Wise) introduced the Restoring Ethical
Standards, Transparency and Responsibility in Congressional Trading Act, or,
RESTRICT Ace. The RESTRICT Act, according to Congressman Duffy, removes
any doubt over the obligations members of Congress have regarding material, nonpublic information. Among the provisions of the RESTRICT Act is the directive
that all members of Congress and their senior staff be required to either 1) move all
of their assets into a blind trust, or

2)

disclose any transaction within 3 days. 53

Although the RESTRICT Act would effectively eliminate insider trading by
members of Congress, it has received little notoriety or attention from
Congressman Duffy's colleagues.
c. The Empire Strikes Back 54 555 6 •

52
53

1d.
1d.
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The single most destructive issue surrounding this legislative miscarriage is the inability- and
disincentive- for law enforcement and its affiliates to prosecute Congressmen and Senators for such
behavior even if it were unambiguously illegal. The SEC is funded by Congress. While, it may not seem
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IV. Conclusion
The dangers of allowing the practice of insider trading by members of
Congress to continue are perilous. The practice undermines the integrity of the
market and worse, the confidence the people of the United States have in their
government. If! eft untended, it would lead to the irrevocable estrangement of the
government to their people and the system would be broken. The STOCK Act will
fail to redress this harm as the law, as written, does nothing to alter the course, but
provides an ineffective detour on the road to continuing the practice.

plausible that Congress would retaliate against its own agencies for doing their job, it has. In 2006, the
William Jefferson, when he was Representative William Jefferson of the 2nd District of Louisiana was
indicted on Federal bribery charges after $90,000 in cash was found in his freezer. 56 The FBI executed a
properly constituted search warrant on Jefferson's congressional office in the hunt for additional
incriminating evidence. In response, the House of Representatives exploded, claiming it was an
55
unconstitutional violation of the "speech and debate" clause and threatened to cut the budget of the
Department of Justice". The Congress of the United States threatened financial retribution against an
agency designed to protect the American citizenry from of all kinds and of the direst importance.
55
The Speech and Debate Clause refers to Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Federal Constitution which
states that members of both houses "shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going
to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place."
56
"Threats Followed FBI Search of Congressman's Office." Associated Press.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,197293,00.html (accessed February 12, 2012).
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V. Moral Underpinnings
a. Moral Theory of John Finnis
While a moral indictment of the conduct at issue has been made, it is
important to discuss the alignment of that indictment with certain moral
principles; specifically, a discussion of the moral philosophy of Natural Law
theorist John Finnis. In his "Natural Law & Natural Rights" Finnis enumerates
seven basic goods - or as Finnish himself describes as "irreducibly" fundamental
aspects of human well-being57 . Finnis lists life, knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness and religion as the primal "goods"
one should seek to participate in and embrace throughout one's life. In the pursuit
of these goods, Finnis expounds on the notion of "practical reasonableness", or, the
effective and proper manner by which these basic goods be enjoyed.
Life, Finnis says, refers to a vast array of components that comprise its
common understanding. Bodily health, freedom from pain and disease and the
preservation of one's own life as well as that of others. Finnis cites several
institutions, networks and systems that exist solely to enrich and preserve this
basic value. Additionally, Finnis partially incorporates the process of procreation
and child rearing as part and parcel of this basic good. Knowledge, the pursuit of
which for its own sake, is another fundamental good that one should seek to
acquire. Knowledge, not merely as a vehicle to pursue other goods, but to fulfill
the basic inclination to desire and embrace the truth. According to Finnis, the
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Finnis, John. Natural Law & Natural Rights. New York: 1980.
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natural proclivity of humans to exhibit curiosity is demonstrative of their desire to
understand the objective truth of a situation and to avoid ignorance and
unknowing. Finnis describes "play" as engaging in an activity for no purpose other
than to engage in the activity. This absence of any ulterior or serious motivation is
evidence that "play" exists, if only in the negative. Its value unto itself, Finnis says,
is proven by the various global institutions that exist only to promote participation
in this basic good. Finnis next discusses the concept of "aesthetic experience", or
simply, "beauty". While beauty is often a part of play, Finnis distinguishes the two
by noting participation in "beauty" requires no action on the part of the
participant, rather merely an inward appreciation of that which is outside of the
individual. Finnis also includes the notion that beauty can - to a greater extent be participated in by creating some significant work of one's design that can be
appreciated. 58
The fifth basic good Finnis describes as sociability or friendship. This good
can be embraced along a spectrum of intensity, ranging from mere harmony with
other persons to an intimate and full friendship. Friendship, Finnis points out, is a
relationship between individuals wherein one party acts out of the interest of the
other and to the betterment of the other's well-being. However, this is only one
relationship possible in exploring the good of sociability as a whole 59 . The next
good, which shares its name with the desirable method of achieving the other
goods: "practical reasonableness", as Finnis puts it, is the process of obtaining the
58
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other goods by effective, efficient, and productive ways, which he explains in detail
and will be discussed shortly. The seventh and last fundamental good Finnis offers
is religion. Religion is not, Finnis makes clear, an acceptance or belief in the Divine
but rather a thoughtful and thorough contemplation of the origin of human
reason, life, and the cosmos. Doing so, Finnis suggests, allows one to better
understand his own role among fellow humans and his own purpose. 60
c. Requirements of Practical Reasonableness
The pursuit of these goods requires an assessment process Finn is coins as
"practical reasonableness." Practical reasonableness provides a checklist, as it were,
to consult when attempting to participate in each of the enumerated goods. Finnis
provides eight criteria worthy of consideration that if followed, allows not only for
the participation of the fundamental goods, but under circumstances beneficial for
the interested parties.
Finnis begins by asserting that man's energies should be devoted to a
singular "rational life plan" 6 '. This, according to Finnis, is more than merely
blueprints, but a concordant, harmonious relationship among every decision an
individual makes, in pursuit of an ultimate objective or achievement. That is to
say, if one wishes to achieve a maximal level of physical fitness, one would not
engage in activities contra to that goal; smoking, drinking, drug abuse, etc. Each
rung of the ladder must be ascending, or at least moving laterally. Finnis expands
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this notion in declaiming that one should view his or her life from the perspective
of that life's terminus. Every decision must be a rational part of a larger, life-long
continuum that should be assessed as if one were living their final days.
Finnis next contends that no value should be arbitrarily preferred over
another 62 . He stresses that preference is permissible and indeed favorable, but that
it must have considered "one's capacities, circumstances ...and one's tastes."
Simply, Finnis believes one must have some "good reason" to subordinate one
value to another. One cannot, Finnis warns, prefer one good over another because
one devalues another good or overvalues an "instrumental" good, such as wealth or
opportunity. One can reasonably choose to not pursue knowledge, but one cannot
reasonably deny the importance of knowledge nor the desirability of avoiding
ignorance. Following suit, Finnis then applies the same principles to the
preference of persons. Finnis states that one cannot arbitrarily select to protect the
interests of one person over another, but must have some rational reason in so
doing. This is not a difficult standard to satisfY; it is reasonable to choose one's
child over an unfamiliar child, one's friend over one's enemy and one's family over
another's. Finnis also allows what he calls a "reasonable scope for self-preference",
or the permissibility in certain situations to select one's own interests over other's.
Detachment and commitment 6', Finnis declares, are also necessa1y to
appropriately assess the pursuit of fundamental goods. Finnis remarks that one
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should not be so invested into any project that the failure of which would result in
devastation to one's overall life plan. In this, Finnis argues that one must be
sufficiently detached from a situation or task as to allow that person to handle
disappointment reasonably and to move on from the letdown. Conversely but
concordantly, Finnis stresses the need for commitment. Commitment, according
to Finnis, is the necessary effort required to appropriately engage a task and that if
one decides to apply himself, he must not surrender the project lightly. After all,
Finnis reminds, the pursuit of any of the basic goods requires some commitment;
to too easily give up would be tantamount to absence from any of the fundamental
goods.
The sixth requirement Finn is describes as "efficiency within reason" 64 . This
requires that the pursuit of any good must be clone in a manner properly suited for
the situation. One must not "waste one's opportunities by using inefficient
methods. One's actions should be judged by their effectiveness ... their fitness of
purpose ... utility [and] consequences." Simply put, this requirement asks that one
should attempt to achieve the most good with the least amount of effort. Given the
option of relieving pain or relieving pain and healing Finnis postulates, the latter is
clearly preferable. This requirement demands more than mere "calculus" as Finnis
calls it, or simple "cost-benefit" analyses. This is largely clue to the incongruence
between (and adherence to) a system of weighing goods and weighing moral
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decisions. This manifestation of consequentialism is arbitrary and unacceptable
according to Finnis.
Next, Finnis stresses the need for respecting every basic value in every act 65 .
This requirement can be satisfied by acting in a manner that serves no purpose
other than to damage the pursuit of a basic value. The only way that such action
can be justifiable is if there is some consequence, the good of which outweighs the
damage inflicted. This is obtainable, Finnis says, simply by being deliberative in
one's actions. One that acts deliberately acts only to protect or preserve some basic
good, even if that good is selfish or facially malicious. Finnis' final two
requirements to ensure practical pursuit of the basic goods are those which
consider the common good, and those which reflect the inclinations of one's
conscience. Simply, maintaining harmony with one's conscience requires only that
if one "feels" some task or action is wrong, one should not continue. Considering
such feelings are the result of time and experience, it is not unreasonable to
recognize dissonance as a warning to desist.
b. Synergy
Having briefly introduced the moral standard by which the aforementioned
issue will be measured, it is appropriate therefore to observe how the action of
insider trading by members of congress aligns with or violates the applicable
theory. Concurrently, the discussion will analyze the STOCK Act through the same
sieve and determine the effectiveness of that law. From the outset, the conduct65
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and the attempt at remedy- is condemnable under any theory of morality, yet this
analysis will strive to demonstrate its degeneracy specifically through the lens of
Finnis.
i. Knowledge
The basic good most heavily impacted by the controversial law is
unquestionably "knowledge". While the law deals facially with information,
knowledge and the use of that knowledge, the analysis requires a far more involved
inquiry. The good of knowledge in the Finnisian sense is the pursuit of knowledge
simply for the sake of having it and to promote the avoidance of ignorance. To
examine how "knowledge" is implicated by this law, "knowledge" must be
bifurcated. The first part concerns the actual information that is stigmatized by the
statute. As mentioned, "insider" information is that which comes from the source
of the information but is not disseminated publicly. The law allows for certain
individuals to possess and take advantage of this information while withholding
from others the same privilege. The "information" itself would be used to make
lucrative investments and thus enhance one's well-being.
However, a more profound understanding of"knowledge" exposes a
grimmer and indeed more crucial revelation: the average citizen is not aware that
their representatives are engaging in this activity. Having knowledge of this
controversial practice would alter the perspective of many Americans in their
perception of their government. "Knowledge for knowledge's sake", as Finnis says,
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would require that the citizenry be aware of the actions of their government,
especially when the concealment of those actions impairs a citizen's right to make
accurate and informed decisions about their governance. The current status of the
law- along with the impotent attempt to cure it via the STOCK Act- do little in
the way of properly informing the citizen and allowing them to make well-founded
and rational decisions.
The STOCK Act proves even more injurious to this fundamental good than
even the practice of insider trading itself. The act, as discussed earlier, does not
ban the practice, rather it serves only to confound the average citizen into
believing that it does. The language of the act requires such precise parsing to
understand its deceptive nature that it further prevents the average citizen from
understanding the actions of his representatives. This again is a two-fold attack on
this basic value.
The first attack is the unabashed attempt of congress to write a law so
obtuse and confusing in language, that the average citizen is incapacitated to
become as well-informed as he has a right to be. Second, is the use of the law to
continue a practice that unquestionably clouds the conduct of congressmen and
creates a fog between the representative and his constituent that cannot be
penetrated. As mentioned above, the codification of this Act creates a tangible bar
on actions brought in protest. With the support oflegislative act, congress can sit
comfortably behind the act and claim that it was the result of duly debated and
properly constituted republican procedure. This indisputably restricts the ability of
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citizens to make informed decisions about their representatives and constrains
their right to a transparent and honest government.
An analysis oflife, play, aesthetic experience, and religion would be too
attenuated to be significant for this discussion.
ii. Friendship
Finnis' definition of "friendship" is a relationship where one individual puts
the interests of his friend above his own. Under such a definition, the STOCK Act
and insider trading cannot be sustained. The analysis of this basic good should be
understood from the perspective of the definition and not the word itself. When
taken in the context of a relationship by which one party seeks to enrich the other,
even at the expense of itself, the intended function of Congress is revealed. The
only role of a republican government is to provide the means by which those they
represent can best pursue a fulfilling life. Plainly, the acceptance of an elected post
carries with it as much power as it does responsibility. By choosing to represent
other people, one's own interest must be forfeited or at the least, subordinated to
those he now represents.
Therefore, the behavior of Congress in the instant appraisal unabashedly
attacks this fundamental value. By taking advantage of their position to enrich
themselves- and at the expense of the market and ordinary investors- they act in
diametric opposition to the tenets of friendship. Further, the passage of the
STOCK Act further emphasizes Congress' disregard for the will of their
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constituents. If it were Congress' intent to produce an outright ban on insider
trading by themselves and their staffs, the language of the law would not be too
different from w(b)s-r. Indeed, if their aim was to revive confidence in the
integrity of the institution, the law would be still more plain spoken.
Satisfying Finnis' idea of friendship would require Congress only to do what
they were intended: to abase themselves at the will of the people they claim to
represent and to act only to benefit those individuals who trust in them to speak
for them. If Congress feels this burden is too great, they ought resign the office and
allow those willing to take their place.
iii. Requirements of Practical Reasonableness: Coherent Life Plan
An attempt to justify these shortcomings by declaring them the result of a
practically reasonable rationing process will find little refuge. Finnis demands that
all goods be pursued as part of a "coherent life plan". This can apply to individuals
and institutions alike. An institution founded on the republican ideals of
transparency and fervent representation would not practice conduct that is
inherently furtive. It undermines the principles upon which the institution was
founded and more dangerously jeopardizes the authority that institution can claim
to possess. It follows that a system that as a matter of survival requires honest
communication between its members and its constituents would be incentivized
to sustain that level of veracity if only to maintain their own positions. It is in this
manner that the practice in dispute is wholly contrary to any rational life plan.
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The STOCK Act does little to remedy this. As discussed earlier, that act
exists only to obfuscate the practice and not to abolish it. In the pursuit of a
sustainable, transparent government, lawmakers cannot rationalize such an
insultingly lame attempt at a cure. The survival of a government depends on trust.
Citizens trust their representatives to create laws that not only benefit them, but
are also reasonably easy to understand. The STOCK Act violates this tenant twice.
At first glance, it buries the continuation of the practice underneath a
torrent oflegal terminology and exceptions, which, to the average citizen, may
appear to restrict the action but conceals its more nefarious goal. Its second injury
to basic republicanism is outright lie told to citizens. This act was advertised as the
death knell to the practice of insider trading by congressmen and their staffs. In
practice, it achieves the opposite. The proposal and approval of the STOCK Act is
arguably worse than it never having existed; it tells the citizen a story and prevents
that citizen from checking for himself by creating a labyrinth oflegalese
penetrated only by those with legal training.
iv. No Arbitrary Preferences
Finnis requires that no decision be made with an arbitrary preference for
values or persons. This means that a preferential choice be made only when
supported by some reasonable foundation. In fact, Finnis notes that a decision is
also considered "arbitrary" if the pursuit of a given good is achieved by devaluing
another fundamental good. In that context, the decision to both engage in an
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activity prohibited to the citizenry-at-large and to intentionally avoid holding
oneself accountable is arbitrary and iniquitous. While one can only speculate as to
Congress' rationale in behaving as they do, that speculation is strongly supported
by contextual evidence lending itselfto demonstrate Congress' overwhelming
preference for themselves. While Finnis allows a "reasonable scope of selfpreference", no such defense can be properly asserted. Congress exists only to
serve the people who placed them in office. This narrows a congressman's scope
for self-preference so greatly as to extinguish it entirely. Every action taken by a
"representative", at least while in that capacity, must be favorable only to those he
represents - even at his own expense.
The STOCK Act is extremely arbitrary. It favors Congress for no other
reason that they are Congress. Only congress can pass the laws. Therefore,
congress has the power to pass laws that benefit themselves. This is an example of
just that. The passage of the STOCK Act codifies that means by which
congressmen can continue to insider trade while pretending that it serves to
abolish the practice altogether. The whole process is saturated with inequitable
self-preference. This law considers the interests of none but the congress
themselves and compounds the insult by pawning it off as the death knell of the
practice. This analysis would be of greater depth if there was but the slightest
ambiguity in the design and aim of the law. However, this law can be understood
only as the product of a self-interested, self-absorbed body that abuses its popular
authority to serve itself.
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v. Detachment and Commitment
Finnis requires also that decisions be made with appropriate degrees of
detachment and commitment. In trading on inside information and using their
power to preserve such a practice, congress acts in opposition to these
requirements of practical reasonableness. Detachment, insofar as governing is
concerned, requires that a representative act in the objectively best interests of his
constituents. Further, his decisions must also be tempered with his own
conscience. When coupled, these influences allows a representative to be the voice
of his electorate. Even if his attempts fail before his peers in congress, he is not
personally devastated nor does he feel his purpose has been stricken because he
has vocalized his constituents' concerns and they were outnumbered by the
concerns of other representatives. Moreover, this "ideal" representative would have
satisfactorily "committed" himself in the effort by voicing his district or state's
concerns as far as his role allowed him and would not have abandoned his task
lightly.
The current state of politicking survives no such analysis. Presently,
members of congress are wholly invested in their positions because their positions
are a source of obscene wealth. They become servants to the prospect of fortune
and use their power to benefit themselves without regard for their constituents.
Because they rarely - if ever -act solely for the interests of their citizens, without
the ability to enrich themselves, their position becomes empty and their incentive
to perform, neutered. With respect to detachment, the modern politician falls
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painfully short of satisfaction. The position which they have the privilege of
holding is by its nature detached from all personal endeavors; their purpose in
office is to speak for their people and not for themselves. Failure must also be
allocated concerning "commitment". While congress no doubt pursues these
efforts with aplomb, the pursuits themselves are perfidious. Ipso facto, the pursuit
of an action that violates the purpose of the actor cannot serve to satisfy this
requirement for practical reasonableness. The energy devoted to self-preservation
and enrichment should be directed towards serving the public and not themselves.
On that same note, the energy spent in developing a deceitful and
duplicitous law such as the STOCK Act represents a greedy attachment to power
and an obsessive desire to augment it. The representative should be without
interests outside of those of his constituents. His is merely a conduit that channels
the needs of his citizens and champions their interests for the sake of their
interests only. This act however, demonstrates the effect of representatives who
serve themselves, for the sake of themselves, and have long since forgotten his
purpose as a representative. Rather than proposing laws in the name of the people,
laws like this represent a generation oflawmakers that propose laws that benefit
their constituents incidentally, while the whole of their concern is concentrated on
lengthening their tenure in congress while eliciting some other benefit: i.e.,
individual accession to wealth.
This is proven by the very language of the STOCK Act. It is so confusing
that it forces the individual to rely on the goodwill of his representative. This
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invests so much power in the representative that he becomes frighteningly
attached to the position. Evidence of this is the failure of congress to pass any bill
that so much as mentions "term limits". This ravenous attachment to position and
power undeniably fails Finnis' fifth criterion.
vi. Efficiency
The last remark overlaps with the sixth requirement of practical
reasonableness demanding the efficient appropriation of effort in the pursuit of
goods. While this requirement cannot truly be employed in the instant case, it is
important to note that the effective utilization of skill and energy is recognized by
Finnis as necessary to bring about the fundamental goods. The sixth requirement
assumes that a basic value is being pursued, but the manner which it is procured is
questionable. Concerning the issue in controversy, no good is being pursued. In
fact, the inefficient legislative process is being employed to facilitate the passage of
legislation that damages the values of many others.
Concordantly, the STOCK Act only serves to cloud the law on insider
trading. It creates an ocean of ambiguities that one way or another will have to be
sorted out by the courts. This creates a monumental systemic inefficiency. If
congress' intent was to procure an outright ban on insider trading, the language of
the bill would have reflected that.
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vii. No Direct Attack on Other Goods
Recognizing this possibility, Finnis also prohibits any action that serves
only to damage the realization of a value or good by others. This seventh
requirement allows for the indirect and incidental damage of goods if the
expectation and purpose of the action was to promote the realization of another
value or good. This is quite different than "weighing" the pros and cons of an
action which Finnis dismisses as nonsensical and impracticable. Fortunately (or
unfortunately), the analysis of this requirement of practical reasonableness is
unequivocal. Congress has made it so by engaging in an action that directly
impairs the realization of several goods while failing to even offer a good that
might be promoted. As mentioned earlier, the engaging in of insider trading and
the subsequent failure to make an honest attempt to denounce and eliminate the
practice inhibits the citizen's ability to trust and support their government, to
enjoy unadulterated honesty from their representatives and serves to undermine
the very authority that government claims to possess.
The STOCK Act is a direct attack on all of the preceding and pertinent
goods as it serves to exacerbate the problem rather than provide a remedy. For all
of the above reasons, it clouds the language of the law and the restrictions, it
thickens the barrier between constituent and representative and creates an overall
inhibition on the abilities of citizens to pursue goods and values to their rightfully
maximum potential.
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viii. Good of the Community
Finnis' eighth requirement is that the common good of one's community be
better served. In a perverse way, congress is actually acting to benefit the
community of congressmen. In turn, however, the larger community, i.e., the
population of the United States is injured. Therefore, these actions cannot
plausibly be seen to serve the common good. The ninth and final requirement of
practical reasonableness asks that an actor act in congruence with his conscience.
Invoking the Thomist perspective, Finnis states simply that if an act "does not feel
right", then the act should be abandoned. Indeed, if one chooses to do what one
feels is unreasonable, than the act is per se unreasonable. Similarly, no objective
reasoning could justifY a group of individuals trusted with the welfare of a larger
group of people using their positions to benefit themselves without consideration
for that larger group.
ix. Promotion of Justice
Finnis recognizes the importance of justice as a prevailing and pervasive
component that must be considered in the analysis of a given action. Given the
breadth of term like "justice", Finnis splits his analysis into two manifestations:
distributive and commutative 66 .
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a. Distributive Justice
Distributive justice, according to Finnis, is the notion that resources
common to a community are allocated in a manner befitting the most productive
use of the resources 67 • As it pertains to the instant assessment, this would
implicate the distribution of wealth from rich to poor so that the poor could at
least provide for the basic values in their own lives. This, Finnis asserts, is the most
productive use of surplus wealth rather than lying stagnant in the vaults of the
rich. Six criteria exist to measure an action against in determining its satisfaction
of distributive justice.
Primacy is given to "need". Need, per Finnis, is a fundamental component of
the common good 68 . Axiomatically, resources ought to be distributed with due
consideration given to those who would benefit most from its physical receipt.
While this can be corrupted, by those who become needy by their own devices or
by those simply unwilling to exert in their own benefit, this criterion remains
dominant.
Akin to "need" is the element of"function". Function, according to Finnis, is
the "need" of certain roles within a community- whereas "need" considers who by
necessity is want of a resource, "function" considers who within the community
could best use the resource69 . Capacity, Finnis says, is that which considers the
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propensity for individual achievement in the distribution of a resource70 . Examples
include "flutes to flute players" and that higher education, if provided for, should
be granted to those most able to use it. Succinctly, a round peg in a round hole.
Meritorious deserts follow fourth. As the name suggests, those who have
contributed much and through self-sacrifice have benefitted the community
should be duly considered 7'. Conversely, the chance that avoidable risk was created
or foreseen should be considered fifth 72 • The sixth and final criterion asks that each
of the preceding criteria be considered in the context of each individuals
responsibilities within his community; from each to his ability, to each from his
merit, as it were73 •
b. Commutative Justice
The other hemisphere of Finnis' construal of justice is what he refers to as
"commutative justice"74 . Commutative justice is that which applies to
interpersonal relationships. Again Finnis divides this analysis into five criteria.
First, Finnis simply requires that the relationship be between certain
individuals. He invokes a basic example: "A's failure, without good reason, to
perform a on a contract with B is commutatively unjust," 75 as a result, A would pay
B damages in recompense. This is self-explanatory, one owes an obligation to

70
71
72
73
74
75

Ibid.
1bid.
1bid.
1bid.
ld. at 177
ld. at 183

42

another and must fulfill that obligation lest he be in breach of commutatively just
behavior.
Second, Finnis establishes a duty of care. Similar to that of tort law, it is a
requirement to act responsibly towards others they directly interact with; the
avoidance of negligent or reckless activity76 .
Third, Finnis expands the duty of care to demand that one act responsibly
towards those he may not directly interact with, but whose participation in the
same system implicates that individual's interests 77 • A ripe example of this would
be one member of a gym letting his friends in the back door and not requiring
them to pay membership. The gym would suffer and eventually shut down,
depriving others of the benefit that it provided.
Finnis then explains the duty of the citizen to obey and adhere to the laws
of a government, even if those laws may appear unjust78 • Lastly, Finnis requires in
the inverse, that those in power treat respectfully those subject to their authority
and controF9 •
a. Application of Distributive Justice
Both the practice of insider trading and the insipid law offered in remedy
cruelly violate the principles of distributive justice. It should be noted that the
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interests of distributive justice and the common good are closely aligned as they
pertain to this issue and therefore that concept will be discussed as well.
i. Need

It is no coincidence that those in power are also wealthy. The practice ofw
insider trading by members of congress permits those individuals to augment their
wealth by virtue of their power. This cycle serves to exclude those in more
desperate and humble need of such excess. Any extant poverty in a nation where
the lawmakers are privy to wealth beyond measure is the unacceptable result of an
unacceptable practice. The allowance of insider trading blinds those responsible
for the enrichment of society with visions of their own affluence at the expense of
those truly in need.
ii. Function
As per function, the distribution of excess market wealth to those interested
only in its acquisition cannot meet this requirement. For function to be properly
met, the monies available from such surreptitious exchanges would be reinserted
into charitable organizations or at the very least, the federal treasury. This would
ensure that those best situated to use the money most effectively would be in
possession of it.
Instead, as with "need", the money is hoarded by a handful of individuals
who are in no position to productively use their wealth beyond gratifYing their
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own interests. The STOCK Act merely codifies the practice and demonstrates the
unwillingness of the legislature to engage in distributively just behavior.
iii. Capacity
Finnis defines "common" resources as those which no man has an inherent
claim of right. The air, the sea, that which lies in the sea, etc. As opposed to private
property, that carries a self-explanatory interpretation. Money, however, is a
bizarre intermediary. It is required to obtain almost every other resource but is
itself, useless. Because it is tied so closely to human affairs and is as readily
available to the privileged as any other resource would be, it can arguably be
considered common.
Following suit, Finnis' requirement of"capacity" would demand that this
resource be distributed to those most capable of benefitting from it. It can be
stated with some certainty that a body of individuals charged with running the
government - not funding it- would not benefit more from excess wealth then the
besieged farmer or the single mother. The farmer could use the money to repair
and restore his farm (and by extension helping all those who purchase from the
farmer) and the single mother could apply it towards enriching the lives of her
children. These are but two of many examples of individuals better suited to
benefit than our legislators.
iv. Deserts and Contributions
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From the outset this requirement cannot be met. Congressmen have
neither contributed to the production of dividends nor merited the receipt of
them. They "deserve" as much wealth from successful (and rigged) stock trades as
a gambler "deserves" his winnings. Yea, a gambler at least risks losing and is not
privy to what cards the other players are holding.
v. Acceptance of Avoidable Risk
While congressmen who trade on inside information might not create the
risks nor are subject to them, when risks do exist, one never hears them warning
other shareholders (see, citizens) about the potential for loss. So while they have
little part in the failures of the companies which they invest, they have equally
small part in alerting those they claim to represent and protect of those risks.
vi. Relativity to Responsibility
By assuming rulership over their people, congressmen must be held to the
highest standard in behaving justly. Yet, even if they were held to the lowest
standard, their conduct could not plausibly satisfy any of the requirements of
distributive justice.
b. Application of Commutative Justice
Both the practice of insider trading by members of congress and the STOCK
Act implicate Finnis' fifth factor of commutative justice. Seeing as the subject of
the practice and the creators of the law are members of government, congressmen
owe a duty of commutative justice to all of those beholden to their authority. In
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that manner, Congress and their law fail utterly. Congress' fundamental purpose is
the creation oflaws that benefit the common good. Even the most narrow
application of this power could not find Congress' present actions agreeable. This
practice and this law were created unabashedly and specifically for the purpose of
immunizing Congress from punishment for behavior prohibited to the rest of the
country. Their dealings with each other are held in priority over those with their
constituents -whom they are lawfully obligated to represent. It is inconceivable
that such avarice could be justified by any power of Congress.
xi. Confluence and Conclusion
Finnis does not believe that the satisfaction his requirements of practical
reasonableness add up to a "moral" action. Instead, Finnis asks that a decision be
the result of a natural and harmonious combination of each of the requirements;
no one requirement is dispositive of morality or immorality. Further, while every
requirement does not necessarily fit into every moral decision, every moral
decision reflects some conjugation of those requirements.
Ultimately, the practice of insider trading and the creation of a law that
does little more than to deceive the average citizen into believing it a remedy
cannot be sustained under a moral analysis. This objectively and indisputably
selfish conduct is antithetical to Finnis' perception of moral behavior and
anathema to American values of democratic-republican representation and
governance.
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